Outcomes
A dictatorship of long duration comes to an end. The country, a manufactured conglomeration of multiple ethnic groups, devolves into civil war. Militias headed by power-hungry leaders utilize religious differences to promote violence and sow terror among the civilian population. Even in formerly peaceful multi-ethnic enclaves, suspicion and retribution rip apart the social fabric.
The country being described is Yugoslavia after the death of Tito. Yugoslavia was created out of remnants of Europe including the Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Empires after World War I. Like Yugoslavia, the national entity called Iraq did not exist before the 20th century. It was constructed by the British from the remains of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
So here we have in Iraq a parallel situation to the Yugoslavia of the 1990s – the end of dictatorships resulting in sectarian conflict and civil war. It seems a natural occurrence, a set of seemingly incompatible elements trapped together in a pressurized container, exploding when the lid is removed. We’ve seen this type of process before: the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, and eventually Bangladesh; the explosion of the Soviet Union’s republics that continues today with uprising in Chechnya and tension between Russia and Georgia.
Yet the current civilian and military leadership seem to have been taken by surprise by the turn of events in Iraq. Following is some testimony from the August 3, 2006 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The entire Rumsfeld testimony is included just for, well, pure fascination. (Does a man who answers all his own questions ever really listen?) The particular line relevant to the discussion is “Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes.” In a multi-ethnic former dictatorship, sectarian violence leading to civil war would seem to be an outcome with high probability, or at least some probability. The idea that personnel of experience in the Pentagon could not possibly anticipate this result is utterly fantastical.
In general, how could military leaders make the assumption that the war could have only one outcome, that the result would be a US-friendly democracy. Or, put another way, that Iraq becoming a reasonable democracy post-Hussein had a 100% probability. That the leaders ignored the possible outcomes of either 1) civil war resulting in partition, 2) an Islamist republic tilted toward Iran, or 3) some sort of stateless anarchistic terrorist haven and incubator that would outstrip the Taliban’s Afghanistan in significance -- is gross incompetence bordering on malpractice.
As the elder Bush's administration realized, removing Saddam would open a Pandora's Box, potentially releasing the demons of civil war. What has resulted is a Greek tragedy.
The country being described is Yugoslavia after the death of Tito. Yugoslavia was created out of remnants of Europe including the Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Empires after World War I. Like Yugoslavia, the national entity called Iraq did not exist before the 20th century. It was constructed by the British from the remains of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
So here we have in Iraq a parallel situation to the Yugoslavia of the 1990s – the end of dictatorships resulting in sectarian conflict and civil war. It seems a natural occurrence, a set of seemingly incompatible elements trapped together in a pressurized container, exploding when the lid is removed. We’ve seen this type of process before: the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, and eventually Bangladesh; the explosion of the Soviet Union’s republics that continues today with uprising in Chechnya and tension between Russia and Georgia.
Yet the current civilian and military leadership seem to have been taken by surprise by the turn of events in Iraq. Following is some testimony from the August 3, 2006 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
| Sen. John MCCAIN (R., AZ): … General Pace, you said there's a possibility of the situation in Iraq evolving into civil war. That correct? Gen. Peter PACE, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: I did say that, yes, sir. MCCAIN: Did you anticipate this situation a year ago? PACE: No, sir. MCCAIN: Did you, General Abizaid? Gen. John ABIZAID, Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM): I believe that a year ago it was clear to see that sectarian tensions were increasing. That they would be this high, no. |
| Defense Secretary Donald RUMSFELD: Are there still Taliban around? You bet. Are they occupying safe havens in Afghanistan and other places -- correction -- in Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are. Is the violence up? Yes. Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and spring, summer and fall months? Yes, it does. And it tends to decline during the winter period. Does that represent failed policy? I don't know. I would say not. I think you've got an awful lot of very talented people engaged in this. And the decisions that are being made are being made with great care after a great deal of consideration. Are there setbacks? Yes. Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes. Does the enemy have a brain and continue to make adjustments on the ground, requiring our forces to continue to make adjustments? You bet. Is that going to continue to be the case? I think so. Is this problem going to get solved in the near term about this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I don't believe it is, I think it's going to take some time. |
The entire Rumsfeld testimony is included just for, well, pure fascination. (Does a man who answers all his own questions ever really listen?) The particular line relevant to the discussion is “Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes.” In a multi-ethnic former dictatorship, sectarian violence leading to civil war would seem to be an outcome with high probability, or at least some probability. The idea that personnel of experience in the Pentagon could not possibly anticipate this result is utterly fantastical.
In general, how could military leaders make the assumption that the war could have only one outcome, that the result would be a US-friendly democracy. Or, put another way, that Iraq becoming a reasonable democracy post-Hussein had a 100% probability. That the leaders ignored the possible outcomes of either 1) civil war resulting in partition, 2) an Islamist republic tilted toward Iran, or 3) some sort of stateless anarchistic terrorist haven and incubator that would outstrip the Taliban’s Afghanistan in significance -- is gross incompetence bordering on malpractice.
As the elder Bush's administration realized, removing Saddam would open a Pandora's Box, potentially releasing the demons of civil war. What has resulted is a Greek tragedy.
posted by balto at 3:37 PM
2 Comments:
"Does a man who answers all his own questions ever really listen?"
what's the answer?
(tee-hee-hee!)
yeah, thaty's an annoying mannerism rummy's got there. he probably thinks it makes him appear wise and didactic and all.
KEvron
Hi KEv!
A friend of mine saw a clip of Rummy in that hearing and thought (at first) that it was an edited version. Even for Rummy, that was quite a run -- it's more like an Al Franken skit. He seems to be missing part of the idea of the whole Socratic method thing.
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