Outcomes

A dictatorship of long duration comes to an end. The country, a manufactured conglomeration of multiple ethnic groups, devolves into civil war. Militias headed by power-hungry leaders utilize religious differences to promote violence and sow terror among the civilian population. Even in formerly peaceful multi-ethnic enclaves, suspicion and retribution rip apart the social fabric.

The country being described is Yugoslavia after the death of Tito. Yugoslavia was created out of remnants of Europe including the Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Empires after World War I. Like Yugoslavia, the national entity called Iraq did not exist before the 20th century. It was constructed by the British from the remains of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

So here we have in Iraq a parallel situation to the Yugoslavia of the 1990s – the end of dictatorships resulting in sectarian conflict and civil war. It seems a natural occurrence, a set of seemingly incompatible elements trapped together in a pressurized container, exploding when the lid is removed. We’ve seen this type of process before: the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, and eventually Bangladesh; the explosion of the Soviet Union’s republics that continues today with uprising in Chechnya and tension between Russia and Georgia.

Yet the current civilian and military leadership seem to have been taken by surprise by the turn of events in Iraq. Following is some testimony from the August 3, 2006 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Sen. John MCCAIN (R., AZ): … General Pace, you said there's a possibility of the situation in Iraq evolving into civil war. That correct? Gen. Peter PACE, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: I did say that, yes, sir. MCCAIN: Did you anticipate this situation a year ago? PACE: No, sir. MCCAIN: Did you, General Abizaid? Gen. John ABIZAID, Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM): I believe that a year ago it was clear to see that sectarian tensions were increasing. That they would be this high, no.

Defense Secretary Donald RUMSFELD: Are there still Taliban around? You bet. Are they occupying safe havens in Afghanistan and other places -- correction -- in Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are. Is the violence up? Yes. Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and spring, summer and fall months? Yes, it does. And it tends to decline during the winter period. Does that represent failed policy? I don't know. I would say not. I think you've got an awful lot of very talented people engaged in this. And the decisions that are being made are being made with great care after a great deal of consideration. Are there setbacks? Yes. Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes. Does the enemy have a brain and continue to make adjustments on the ground, requiring our forces to continue to make adjustments? You bet. Is that going to continue to be the case? I think so. Is this problem going to get solved in the near term about this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I don't believe it is, I think it's going to take some time.

The entire Rumsfeld testimony is included just for, well, pure fascination. (Does a man who answers all his own questions ever really listen?) The particular line relevant to the discussion is “Are there things that people can't anticipate? Yes.” In a multi-ethnic former dictatorship, sectarian violence leading to civil war would seem to be an outcome with high probability, or at least some probability. The idea that personnel of experience in the Pentagon could not possibly anticipate this result is utterly fantastical.

In general, how could military leaders make the assumption that the war could have only one outcome, that the result would be a US-friendly democracy. Or, put another way, that Iraq becoming a reasonable democracy post-Hussein had a 100% probability. That the leaders ignored the possible outcomes of either 1) civil war resulting in partition, 2) an Islamist republic tilted toward Iran, or 3) some sort of stateless anarchistic terrorist haven and incubator that would outstrip the Taliban’s Afghanistan in significance -- is gross incompetence bordering on malpractice.

As the elder Bush's administration realized, removing Saddam would open a Pandora's Box, potentially releasing the demons of civil war. What has resulted is a Greek tragedy.

Strategy I

For al Qaeda, Iraq is not a distraction from their war on America -- it is the central battlefield where the outcome of this struggle will be decided. -- President George W. Bush in a speech to the Military Officers Association of America, Sept. 5, 2006

As the hobbits are going up Mount Doom, the Eye of Mordor is being drawn somewhere else. It's being drawn to Iraq and it's not being drawn to the U.S. You know what? I want to keep it on Iraq. I don't want the Eye to come back here to the United States. -- Sen. Rick Santorum (R., PA) in an interview with the editorial board of the Bucks County Courier Times, October 17, 2006

So I guess I would rather fight them there than here. I know I would rather fight them there than here, and I know would rather fight them there than in other remote parts of the world, where it may be more difficult to find them. -- President George W. Bush in an interview with Brit Hume (Fox News) Sept 22, 2003

All warfare is based on deception. -- The Art of War By Sun Tzu, 6th century BC

Frodo Baggins and Sam Samwise Gamgee don’t seem to fit the profile of agents of the massive Department of Homeland Security, if we are to realize Santorum’s analogy. They are portrayed as profligate gourmands, however – perhaps that’s some sort of clue that they’re a metaphor for DHS. On the other hand, hobbits don’t wear shoes.

Our mission in the war on terror is to prevent a repetition of the 9/11 attack, an operation involving perhaps a few dozen people and about $500,000. Various studies from credible sources indicate that the Iraq War is increasing the number of terrorists, at least in Iraq. In addition, much of the violence in Iraq is not emanating from groups espousing some sort of pan-Islamic caliphate; it is violence by sectarian and tribal warlords in the simple quest for local and regional power.

So, is it realistic to assume that US involvement in Iraq is somehow using up Al Qaeda resources to the extent that they cannot plan or launch another terrorist attack in America? It seems likely that Bin Laden still has a half million dollars and the services of at least 19 fanatics ready to give their lives for him. And he seems to have regained a stable base for his operations in that netherworld along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Al Qaeda-type cells have certainly been able to launch attacks in Madrid and London.

So let’s consider the “fight them there” strategy from Bin Laden’s point of view. The US is tied down in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Our military is overextended. We are bleeding money. In fact, the US military has been handing over control of Afghanistan operations to NATO forces, further removing us from Bin Laden’s theater of operations. Our “eye” is on Iraq and not on the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

The real reasons that the Bush Administration chose to go into Iraq have been much debated. Their own stated reasoning has been extremely malleable: beginning with the now debunked WMD and Al Qaeda connections, the reasoning has morphed into bringing democracy and “fighting them there”. It is impossible to know whether they believe what they are saying, or whether it is mere public relations.

Perhaps the evidence that the Administration believes what they are saying is that they also seem to believe Bin Laden’s pronouncements about Iraq being Al Qaeda’s central front, rather than realizing that Bin Laden’s strategy and statements may also change with the situation.

But it doesn’t matter what the Administration believes, at least from Bin Laden’s point of view. Not only does the US have insufficient forces to pursue him directly, but our perceived incompetence and weakness has forced Musharraf to make a tenuous deal with the Taliban. It is safe to assume that Bin Laden is simply ecstatic about our venture in Iraq. We have played into his hands. And who knows which Mount Doom he has chosen for his next target?

Blinders

I had a glass in my hand grabbing ice cubes from the ice bin of the refrigerator. One of the cubes slipped, and in my effort to catch it I dropped my glass on the floor, where it shattered into many tiny fragments. This is what happened to the Bush Administration in the Middle East. All they could see was the Saddam ice cube, while the glass (Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq instability, Iran resurgence) shattered on the floor.

Iraq was presented as a false choice: invade or not. Leave Saddam in power or topple him. The media's apparent capacity to carry only one story in any particular news cycle played into this. This environment allowed any tenuous, dubious contact between Iraq and Al Qaeda to be elevated to monumental status. When all that is being discussed is Iraq’s contacts with Al Qaeda, instead of, say, the connections between Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and both Al Qaeda and the Taliban, all sense of scale is lost. Minor contacts were raised to the level of dangerous collusion.

The correct procedure would have been to prioritize the threats. The US and it’s allies certainly began on the right course with the invasion of Afghanistan. But after the great debacle of Tora Bora, where, ironically, Rumsfeld’s ideal of a light flexible force and dynamic tactics yielded to the inertia of using Afghani mercenaries, the most important target was clearly the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Most of the world supported the US after 9/11, and that support continued with the war in Afghanistan. The US appeared strong and focused. This would have been the ideal time to get Pakistan’s cooperation to attack both the Taliban and Al Qaeda on both sides of the border. Pakistan’s President Musharraf could have proceeded with our support, even though Islamists in the opposition and his own ISI would have protested.

But now, all such opportunities have been squandered. The great illogic of attacking Iraq, along with the capricious waste of our troops there, have made us look confused and weak. The pragmatic Musharraf has been forced to accept a dubious treaty with Taliban in Pakistan’s tribal areas (see Pakistan's Tribal Areas map from Frontline). The Taliban and Al Qaeda have secured a region in which they will be able to plot future attacks. (See excellent reporting on this situation by PBS’s Frontline at Frontline: Return of the Taliban.)

One of the reasons given for the invasion of Iraq is that everything was different after 9/11. That is certainly correct, but the resulting change in policy was the exact opposite of what was logical. Before 9/11, we had the luxury of dealing with a resolution to the Hussein question. After 9/11 we needed to prioritize targets, to start with the targets that would provide the greatest benefit to our long-term security. Before September 11, 2001, both Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice spoke of Hussein’s weakness, with Powell famously declaring that Hussein was “in a box”. Today, Iraq is not in it’s box, and we don’t even know where Al Qaeda’s box is.